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Abstract
This paper analyzes a revised fragile watermarking scheme proposed by Botta
et al. which was developed as a revision of the watermarking scheme previously
proposed by Rawat et al. A new attack is presented that allows an attacker
to apply a valid watermark on tampered images, therefore circumventing the
protection that the watermarking scheme under study was supposed to offer.
Furthermore, the presented attack has very low computational and memory
requirements.
Keywords: multimedia security; fragile watermarking; cryptanalysis; content
integrity.
1. Introduction
In recent years we have witnessed an impressive increase in the quantity of
digital images being taken and transmitted, mostly due to the development of
affordable digital cameras and to the high penetration rate of the Internet. This
context has lead to an augmented effort of the scientific community to develop
tools that protect digital images. One of these tools is fragile watermarking,
which is supposed to protect the integrity and authenticity of digital images: a
watermark is inserted in the image such that there are no perceptible changes
to the human eye, but that it is possible to detect any malicious changes to the
image.
Various watermarking schemes have been proposed that work either in the
pixel domain [1, 2, 3] or in the transform domain [4, 5, 6, 7]. As it is normal in
cryptography, a lot of effort has also been put in attacking some of the proposed
watermarking schemes [8, 9, 10].
Rawat et al. have proposed a new fragile watermarking, [3], that embeds the
watermark in the LSB of every pixel. However, it was soon attacked by Teng
et al. [10] as well as by Botta et al. [8] and both papers have also presented
revised versions of the algorithm. Teng et al.’s proposed fragile watermarking
embeds a watermark, that is also a function of the pixel content, in one of the
three least significant bits. A chaotic function is used to determine the exact
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location of the watermark. Botta et al.’s fragile watermarking scheme generates
a watermark that is a function of the pixel value, but always embeds it in the
least significant bit of the pixel. This paper studies the security of Botta et al.’s
fragile watermarking algorithm and shows that it is relatively easy to break.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the
cryptographic perspective that we will use for the cryptanalysis as well as the
different attack models, in order to better understand the cryptographic context
of the attack we propose. Section 3 presents the details of Botta et al.’s fragile
watermarking and an example of its use. In Section 4 we describe the proposed
attack and we present one successful implementation of the attack. Section 5
concludes our work.
2. Cryptographic security
Fragile watermarking is a cryptographic primitive because it tries to protect
the integrity of some data, i.e. the image, in an adversary setting [11]. Therefore,
in order for a fragile watermarking algorithm to be considered secure, it must
respect Kerckhoffs Principle [12, 13]. This means that the algorithm must be
secure in the worst case scenario: when the attacker knows all the details of the
algorithm except the secret key that was being used. Also, the algorithm must
be secure in all of the 4 most common models of attack [11]:
• ciphertext only model: the attacker only has access to some protected
data.
• known plaintext model: the attacker has access to some protected data
as well as the corresponding unprotected data.
• chosen plaintext model: the attacker is able to obtain the correspond-
ing protected data of some (unprotected) data he chooses.
• chosen ciphertext model: the attacker is able to submit some pro-
tected data to the cryptographic primitive under attack and can obtain
the corresponding unprotected data or the verification of its integrity.
In the above enumeration we have used the terms ”protected data” and ”un-
protected data” in order to make the definitions as broad as possible. For exam-
ple, if the cryptographic primitive under study is an encryption algorithm, the
”protected data” is the ciphertext, while the ”unprotected data” is the plaintext.
This paper will present a chosen plaintext attack on a recently proposed
fragile watermarking algorithm. In the case of fragile watermarking, the term
”protected data” refers to the watermarked image, while the term ”unprotected
data” refers to the unprotected image, i.e. the image prior to the embedding of
the watermark.
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3. Revised fragile watermarking algorithm
Botta et al. have recently proposed a fragile watermarking algorithm [8]
based on the cryptanalysis of Rawat et al’s fragile watermarking algorithm [3].
The proposed fragile watermarking algorithm embeds the watermark as follows:
E1. The original image, Ih, of size m × n is scrambled using Arnold cat map
[14] k times, to obtain the scrambled image Is.
E2. A chaotic sequence, C, is generated using logistic map [15]. The sequence
is of same size as the image Ih. Further, the values of C are rounded off to
obtain a bit sequence.
E3. For every pixel pi, of coordinates x and y, the binary chaotic watermark
Wc(x, y) is computed as:
Wc(x, y) = parity(W (x, y)⊕C(x, y) |MACk(pi)AND0×FE | x | y)) (1)
where ”parity” means the number of bits with value one, W represents the
original watermark, MAC is a Message Authentication Code and ”|” means
concatenation.
E4. Embed Wc in the LSB (Least Significant Bit) of every pixel of Is.
E5. To obtain the watermarked image, Iw, Apply Arnold cat map T-k times,
where T is the period of Arnold cat map.
For watermark extraction from a watermarked image, Iw, the following steps
need to be performed:
D1. The watermarked image is scrambled applying Arnold cat map k times, to
obtain the image Iws.
D2. The binary chaotic sequence C is computed exactly the same way as for
the embedding process.
D3. For every pixel pi, of coordinates x and y, an expected watermark is com-
puted as:
We(x, y) = parity(W (x, y)⊕C(x, y) |MACk(pi)AND0×FE | x | y)) (2)
D4. A new image, Itemp, is constructed as the absolute difference between the
expected watermark, We(x, y) and the LSB of every pixel of Iws.
D5. The tampered regions are detected applying Arnold cat map T-k times on
Itemp.
We have implemented Botta et al’s watermarking algorithm and we present
the results in Figure 1.
Figure 1a shows the original image, which has been watermarked with the
watermark image shown in Figure 1b. The resulting watermarked image is
presented in Figure 1c. We have tampered the watermarked image by inserting
a boat on the lake, as shown in Figure 1d. Then, we have applied the watermark
detection and we have obtained the tampered regions presented in Figure 1e.
We can conclude that the watermarking algorithm performs as expected.
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(a) Original image
(b) Image watermark
(c) Watermarked image
(d) Tampered image
(e) Detected tampered images
Figure 1: Botta et al’s fragile watermarking algorithm
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4. Cryptanalysis
In this section we will present an attack against Botta et al’s fragile water-
marking scheme. We will first describe the attack and then show the results of
its implementation
4.1. Attack description
The attack presented in this paper falls under the chosen plaintext model,
i.e. the attacker needs to be able to obtain the watermarked version of some
images he chooses.
The watermarking algorithm under study is supposed to be secure because
the embedded watermark in every pixel is a function of the secret key, the 7 most
significant bits of the pixel and of the pixel coordinates. However, this means
that if a pixel in a given location in the image, (x, y), has the same value in
different images, the same watermarking bit will be embedded. Moreover, since
the LSB of the pixel is used to embed the watermark, only 27 = 128 possible
values exist for every pixel position.
Therefore, the attacker needs to know the watermarking bit Wc(i) for every
pixel pi, of coordinates x and y. For this, he will run the watermarking algo-
rithm 128 times and will store the LSB plane of the watermarked image. With
this information, the attacker will construct a three dimensional look-up table
whose search fields will be the two coordinates, (x, y), and the value of the 7
most significant bits of the pixel, and whose values will be the corresponding
watermarking bit Wc(i). This look-up table requires m × n × 128 bits storage
space.
Once the attacker has constructed the above mentioned look-up table, he can
apply a valid watermark on any image. Therefore, the attacker has the ability to
circumvent the protection offered by the watermarking algorithm under study.
4.2. Implementation results
We have implemented the proposed attack and we were able to apply a valid
watermark on a tampered image, as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2a shows the image watermarked with the watermark image pre-
sented in Figure 2b. We have tampered this image by inserting a boat in the
lake and we have used the attack presented in the previous subsection to apply
a valid watermark on the tampered image. The resulting image is shown in 2c.
When running the watermark detection algorithm, the LSB of all the pixels will
be equal to the expected watermark computed using Eq. (2), therefore the wa-
termarking algorithm will not detect that there are tampered regions, as shown
in Figure 2d.
5. Conclusions
This paper has analyzed the security of a recently proposed fragile water-
marking scheme and has presented an attack that is capable to circumvent the
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(a) Watermarked image
(b) Image watermark
(c) Attacked tampered image
(d) Detected tampered regions
Figure 2: Unsuccessful detection of tampered image
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protection that the watermarking scheme under study is supposed to offer. Fur-
thermore, the computational complexity of the attack is very small, only 128
runs of the watermarking scheme are needed. Also, the memory requirements
are very limited, only m×n×128 bits are needed. We have abstained ourselves
from proposing an improvement to the scheme because we feel there are a lot of
available watermarking schemes and that the scientific community would benefit
more from a thorough analysis of the already proposed watermarking schemes.
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